

PHIL 4200/5200 CONSCIOUSNESS
MW 10:50 – 12:05
OFFICE HOURS M-F 8:30 – 4:00 pm

SPRING 2014

REX WELSHON
DWIRE 112
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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course covers some of the recent empirical work on consciousness and a lot of the recent philosophical work on consciousness. We investigate questions including the following: what is consciousness? Are there distinct kinds of consciousness? What are their distinguishing characteristics? Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Is consciousness an emergent field property of distributed neural networks? Why do qualia pose a problem for physiological reductionism? What is monitoring consciousness? What is the unity of consciousness?

REQUIRED BOOKS

Chalmers, D., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford U. Press, 2002) (hereafter 'C')
Welshon, R., *Philosophy, Neuroscience, and Consciousness* (Acumen, 2011) (hereafter 'W')

COURSE REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING

Requirements: Four 3 page précis; one 12 page analytic research paper, due at the end of the semester. Late papers without granted extensions down-graded one-half letter grade per day late. Attendance crucial and expected; participation encouraged. Reading is to be completed prior to class.

Cheating: Any cheating (including, but not limited to, plagiarism, recycling, or purchasing papers) will result in an automatic 'F' for the course, without opportunity for grade change.

Grading: Each précis – 10% x 4 = 40%; final paper = 50%; participation = 10%

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE (subject to change)

- Week 1: PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION
W, Introduction, Chapter 1
Block, "Concepts of Consciousness," in C, pp.206-218
Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" in C, pp.219-225
- Week 2: PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS I: IDENTITY, SUPERVENIENCE, AND EMERGENCE
W, Chapter 2
Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in C, pp. 60-67
Hill, "Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem," in C, 334-340
- Week 3: PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS II: REDUCTIVE AND NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM
W, Chapter 3
Block, "Troubles with Functionalism," in C, pp.94-98
- Week 4: REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS I: INTENTIONALITY
W, Chapter 4
Brentano, "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena," in C, 479-483
Chisholm, "Intentional Inexistence," in C, 484-491
- Week 5: REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS II: HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES
W, Chapter 4
Rosenthal, "Explaining Consciousness," in C, 406-422
Dretske, "Conscious Experience," in C, 422-435
- Week 6: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS I: CORTICAL AND COGNITIVE EVOLUTION
W, Chapter 5
Wynn, "Archaeology and Cognitive Evolution"*
- Week 7: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS II: AROUSAL AND PERCEPTION

W, Chapter 6
Welshon, "Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity"

- Week 8: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS III: AFFECT AND INTEROCEPTION
W, Chapter 6
- Week 9: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS IV: ATTENTION, WORKING MEMORY, AND LANGUAGE
W, Chapter 7
- Week 10: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS V: NEURAL MODELLING AND FIELD PROPERTIES
W, Chapter 8
- Week 11: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE I: MEASUREMENT, LOCALIZATION, AND DISSOCIATION
W, Chapter 9
Broad, "Mechanism and Its Alternatives," in C, 106-115
Klein, "Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, advance access published on 7 August 2009, DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp035
- Week 12: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE II: CORRELATES, REALIZERS, MULTIPLE REALIZATION
W, Chapter 10
Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," in C, pp.135-149
- Week 13: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE III: REDUCTION, OVERDETERMINATION, AND COUPLING
W, Chapter 11
Kim, "The Many Problems of Mental Causation," in C, pp. 170-178
Van Gelder, "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?" *Journal of Philosophy* 91 (1995): 345-382
- Week 14: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE IV: EMBODIED, EMBEDDED, AND EXTENDED CONSCIOUSNESS
W, Chapter 12 and Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Clark and Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," in C, 643-652
Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," in C, 354-361
- Week 15: Writing Week, no class
- Week 16: FINAL PAPER DUE ON DAY OF SCHEDULED FINAL, WEDNESDAY, 12/14/11

DISABILITIES: STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES SHALL SUBMIT THEIR PAPERWORK TO ME IN PERSON WITHIN THE FIRST WEEK OF CLASS

PHIL 4200, SPRING 2014

REVISED READING SCHEDULE

- March 31, April 2: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS II: AROUSAL, PERCEPTION, AFFECT, AND INTEROCEPTION
W, Chapter 6
Welshon, "Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity"
- April 7, 9: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS III: ATTENTION, WORKING MEMORY, AND LANGUAGE
W, Chapter 7
- April 14: SCIENCES OF CONSCIOUSNESS IV: NEURAL MODELLING AND FIELD PROPERTIES
W, Chapter 8
- April 16: **NO CLASS ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16.**
- April 21, 23: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE I: MEASUREMENT, LOCALIZATION, DISSOCIATION; CORRELATES AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION
W, Chapters 9 and 10
- April 28, 30: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE II: MULTIPLE REALIZATION, OVERDETERMINATION, AND COUPLING
W, Chapters 10 and 11
Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," in C, pp.135-149
- May 5: PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE III: EMBODIED, EMBEDDED, AND EXTENDED CONSCIOUSNESS
W, Chapters 11, 12 and Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Clark and Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," in C, 643-652
Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," in C, 354-361
- May 7: Writing Day; **NO CLASS ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 7.**
- Week 16: **FINAL PAPER, HARD COPY ONLY, DUE WEDNESDAY, 5/16/14, 5:00 pm, in my office, COH 2025.** Early submissions are welcome.